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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a game-theoretic model to analyze how the
existence of roduct-flexible manufacturing technology can affect the
technology and market strategies of competing firms. Our two-firm, two-
market model allows each firm to invest in a technology dedicated to its
home market or a flexible technology that also can be used to invade its
rival's market and/or provide a credible threat to retaliate if its own
market is invaded. In contrast to single-firm models in which the
availability of a flexible technology at a low cost makes firms better off, we
find that unless several restrictive conditions are met, the existence of
flexible technology (at a reasonable cost) can intensify competition; firms
would be better off if the flexible technology did not exist. Depending on
the nature of the competition, consumers may or may not benefit from its
existence.
The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Garth Saloner,
Mihkel Tombak, and seminar participants at MIT, Stanford, Columbia, and
ORSA/TIMS.
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1. Introduction
The increasingly volatile and competitive business environment
faced by American manufacturing firms has generated considerable
interest in the deployment of flexible manufacturing systems (FMSs). In
addition to its use as a tactical tool to respond quickly to variations in
demand within a market (Fine and Freund 1990), or to reduce inventory
requirements (Graves 1988; Caulkins and Fine 1990), flexible technology
may also be employed strategically by the firm both to defend its own
markets and to enter the markets of its less flexible competitors. In this
paper, we focus on this strategic function of flexible technology. We
present a competitive model which describes the impact of product-
flexible manufacturing systems on firms' output and technology
investment decisions.
As used here, flexibility refers to a production technology that can be
modified, with little or no cost, to produce a variety of different goods. (See
Piore (1986) for a useful flexibility taxonomy.) Many of the recent
developments in the FMS investment evaluation literature (surveyed by
Fine 1989) address some aspect of this feature of flexibility. See, for
example, Fine and Freund (1990), Fine and Li (1988), Karmarkar and
Kekre (1987), Kulatilaka (1988), and Vander Veen and Jordan (1989), each
of which addresses some aspect of flexibility, but none of which considers
interfirm competition. With respect to the explicit modeling of
competition, the papers most closely related to ours are Gaimon (1989) and
Roller and Tombak (1990). Gaimon uses a two-firm, continuous-time
model to compare how firms' technology acquisition strategies compare
under the assumptions of open-loop or closed-loop dynamics. The decision
variables for each firm are the price charged, the rate of acquisition of new
technology, and total capacity from old and new technology. Although her
model of new manufacturing technology captures important correlates of
flexibility, such as improved market share and lower variable costs,
flexibility is not modeled explicitly. The results show that firms charge
higher prices, acquire less new technology, buy less total capacity, and
earn higher profits in the closed-loop game.
Roller and Tombak (1989) present a two-firm technology acquisition
model with two differentiated products, each characterized by linear
demand function, with a positive cross-price effect. Their results show (1)
when products are highly differentiated, industry is driven to adopt FMS,
(2) as markets become larger and as the difference between fixed costs of
the two technologies diminishes, incentives to invest in FMS increase, and
(3) the introduction of FMS improves economic welfare.
In our two-firm, repeated-game model, each firm may find it
desireable to forego entry into the other's primary market, even if each
has the technology to produce for both markets. Flexible capacity serves
as a mechanism to prevent such entry. Entry by one firm into its rival's
market may trigger a retaliatory punishment strategy ("grim" strategy)
that leads both firms to achieve a mutually less profitable equilibrium
path. In our model flexible capacity provides a credible threat to enter its
rival's market in retaliation, if necessary.
Our purpose is to illustrate the strategic dynamics that can result
among firms due to the availability of product-flexible manufacturing
technologies. As a result, we present a very simple model that highlights
the increased competition that may be fueled by the existence of flexible
technology. In particular, we show how the existence of flexible
technology can make firms worse off. To incorporate the concepts
discussed here into a credible decision support system to aid managers in
technology investment decisions would be a formidable task. However,
managers who use decision support models to aid technology investment
decisions without considering the issues highlighted here could estimate
incorrectly the benefits and strategic implications of such investments.
The next section describes the models to be considered, including a
formulation of the problem and assumptions about the timing of actions
and cost structure of the different technologies available. Model I,
presented in Section 3, examines the competitive interaction of firms in a
duopolistic market when the game permits only a one-time purchase of
technology before production. Model II, considered in Section 4, relaxes
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the restriction on technology purchase and permits firms to acquire
technology before each period of production. In both sections, we show
how the existence of flexible technology can intensify competition and
make firms worse off. We conclude in Section 5 with a discussion of
results and directions for future research.
2. Model Formulation
We want to evaluate the impact of flexible manufacturing systems
and competition on firms' technology investment decisions. We use a two-
firm, two-product model with three types of technology available. The first
technology type represents a flexible system that may be employed in
production of goods for either market. The other two technologies are
dedicated--each restricted to manufacture of one product.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that when the firm purchases a
technology, flexible or dedicated, it acquires sufficient capacity of that
technology to satisfy all demand in the market(s) it is capable of serving.
That is, the minimum efficient scale of each technology is sufficient to
satisfy the market demand. This assumption enables us to concentrate on
the decision to invest in a particular type of technology independent of the
complicating issue of capacity quantity, which is addressed by Fine and
Freund (1990) in the single-firm, stochastic-demand version of this model.
In Model I (Section 3), to reflect the long lead times associated with
investment decisions, as compared to those for production, we permit the
acquisition of capacity only once prior to the start of the T-period
production horizon. In contrast, the timing in Model II (Section 4) allows
firms to acquire additional technology before each of the production
periods. In this latter model, a firm may choose to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude, postponing some investment until after observing its rival's
earlier actions.
We denote the two firms as 1 and 2, and the two markets as A and B.
Let KA and KB, respectively, denote the dedicated technology that can only
manufacture products for markets A and B, and let KAB denote the flexible
technology that can produce for both markets. These decision variables
are indicator variables that represent the choice to purchase or not
4purchase each technology for a fixed one-time investment cost. We denote
by CA CB CAB, respectively, the investment and installation costs of
acquiring technologies KA, KB, and KAB.
Mm Dm
Let iri (cti ) denote the per-period monopoly (duopoly) profits, net
of operating costs, for firm i in market m, for i=1,2; m=A,B. We assume
that operating profits for each firm in each market are independent of the
technology used. This assumption could hold, for example, if the variable
cost of producing one unit of product A is the same whether it is produced
with the flexible technology or with the dedicated A-technology. For highly
automated (flexible or dedicated) manufacturing systems, where most of
the variable costs are material costs, this assumption seems reasonable.
Both firms use a per-period discount factor of (0<6<1) over an industry
horizon of length T.
We make the following assumptions about the cost and profit
parameters:
ASSUMPTION 2.0: 'i > 7i for i=1, 2, m=A, B,
ASSUMPTION 2.1: CAB > C A and CAB > CB,
ASSUMPTION 2.2: CA + CB > CAB,
ASSUMPTION 2.3a: C < 6 t Dl
ASSUMPTION 2.3b: C <,6 2TDB
The first assumption states the elementary result from microeconomics
that profit levels are higher when a firm operates alone in a market than
when there is duopolistic competition in that same market. The second
assumption says that the more complex flexible technology costs more to
acquire than either type of dedicated system. That is, there is some cost
associated with the benefits that the flexible capacity provides. The third
assumption indicates that it is more economical to purchase a flexible
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5system than two dedicated systems if the firm is going to operate in both
markets. Thus, if a firm desires the capability to operate in both markets,
the lowest cost technology purchase decision results in the firm only
buying a flexible system. The last pair of assumptions ensures that each
firm will find it profitable to enter at least one market even if it will only
earn duopoly profits in that market. In particular, Assumption 2.3 suggests
the allocation of market A to firm 1 and market B to firm 2.
We also assume, for each market, that the monopoly profits accrued
to a single firm in that market exceed the sum of the duopoly profits
available to two firms in that market. This assumption holds, for example,
under Cournot-Nash competition with linear demand curves and many
other common models. Formally, we have
ASSUMPTION 2.4: 7CM > 7i CD+ 7j i=1,2, ji, m=A,B.
In essence, this assumption states that the two firms cannot costlessly
enforce a cartel-like agreement to split up the monopoly profits in a single
market. That is, if a market is split up and no cartel enforcem-nt
mechanism exists, the firms' best response duopoly strategies will yield
less profit than if they could enforce a joint restriction to the monopoly
output. See, for example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) for more on the
costs of enforcing collusive agreements.
We assume that the firms have an opportunity to discuss possible
collusive agreements before the start of the technology purchase and
output production game. Any such agreement would have to be self-
enforcing because such agreements are not enforceable in court. By self-
enforcing, we mean that each firm finds it in its own best interest to abide
by the terms. One possible collusive agreement is to have firm 1 assigned
market A and firm 2 to market B. In the subsequent sections, we discuss
the conditions that are conducive to the firms abiding by such an
agreement and we describe the environment that encourages investment
in flexible technology as a strategic weapon to enforce or undermine such
agreements.
In effect, we assume that firms can observe compliance to an
agreement that specifies which market(s) to enter, but cannot observe
6compliance for an agreement that specifies precise output levels in a
market for each firm. When a cartel assigns either all or none of a specific
market to a specific firm, cheating on the agreement is easier to observe
than if it specifies the level of output to be produced in each market or if it
specifies the equipment to be put inside each firm's factories. One might
reasonably assume that firms could agree not to acquire a certain
technology, but to be effective, each firm would need to have a retaliation
mechanism to enforce the agreement. This type of agreement is discussed
towards the end of Section 4
Finally, we assume that the two markets, A and B, are roughly
comparable in size. Formally, we assume
Mm Dm D'ASSUMPTION 2.5: 7i m> i + 7i for i=l, 2; m, m' = A, B; mm'.
This assumption assures that each firm would prefer a monopoly position
in one market to a duopoly position in both.
3. Model I: One-Time Technology Acquisition
We analyze a two-stage game in which firms simultaneously and
independently acquire production technology in period 0 (first stage), after
which follows a T-period production horizon (second stage) for which we
consider three cases: (1) T=1, (2) l<T<oo, and (3) T=oo. In stage two, in each
period, the firms learn of the previous-period decisions made by each
other and then simultaneously and independently make their production
decisions. Profits accrue in each period according to the different
monopoly and duopoly profit levels described above.
By assumptions 2.4 and 2.5, each firm would prefer to restrict each
firm to a single market rather than engage in competition in both markets.
We assume that the firms begin with the following (efficient) agreement,
preceding the technology acquisition and production stages: Firm 1 agrees
to produce only for market A and firm 2 agrees to produce only for market
B. This agreement serves only as a tentative pact or focal point (Schelling,
1960); if collusion occurs, this is the form it will take. Also, we use this
focal point to choose among the multiplicity of equilibria that exist in this
7game. The existence of the above agreement does not guarantee
compliance; each firm will only adhere to it (and only credibly agree to it)
if doing so is in its best interest.
Analysis of Second-Stage Outcomes
To determine the payoff structure for the game described above, we
first analyze the production stage of the game for all possible outcomes of
the earlier, technology acquisition stage. First note that there are four
possible outcomes for the technology investment stage of the game,
depending on whether firm 1 acquires KA or KAB and on whether firm B
acquires K B or K A B . (We note that it is also possible for firm 1 to acquire
KB or firm 2 to acquire KA, but we rule out these possibilities with our
focal point assumption.)
Given the above collusive agreement, one possible outcome is that
each firm buys only the dedicated capacity relevant for its own assigned
market. We denote this case by (KA, KB). In this case, each firm has locked
itself into the production of one good for the entire horizon. Each reaps the
MA DB
monopoly profits, (7l1 andn 2 , respectively, for firms 1 and 2) in one
market and incurs investment costs of acquiring one dedicated technology
(CA and CB, respectively). Since technology can be acquired only in period
0, this outcome obtains in the (KA,KB) case for all values of T >1.
If, however, firm 1 acquired dedicated A technology at cost CA, and
firm 2 chose the flexible technology at cost CAB, then firm 2 has incentive
to cheat on the agreement: Not only does firm 2 have the physical
capability to produce for both markets, but also firm 1 can offer no
retaliation once it has made its one-time technology decision in period 1.
Firm 2 establishes itself as an unchallenged monopolist in market B and as
an invading duopolist in market A. Thus, the (KA,KAB) outcome results in
DA MB
operating profits of ( 1 A )in each period for firm 1 and (t 2 +c 2 B )in each
period for firm 2. This outcome also obtains for any T' 1. A symmetric
outcome obtains for the (KAB,KB) case.
Determining the production outcomes and payoffs when both firms
purchase the flexible capacity in period 1 is more complex. In this
(KAB,KAB) case, each firm has the ability to operate in both markets, but
is, by assumption, better off if each produces, without competition, in a
single market. If T=1, the production subgame for this outcome resembles
the classic Prisoner's Dilemma problem (see Figure 1): If both firms adhere
to the collusive agreement, then they will both earn monopoly profits; if
firm 1 honors the agreement but firm 2 does not, then the profits for the
two firms will be (i 1 '2 + 2 ) likewise, if firm 2 honors the agreement
and firm 1 does not, the symmetric result obtains. When neither firm
honors the agreement, then the profit vector is ( 1 + +D B D DB .
Thus, each firm prefers to produce for both markets regardless of what its
rival does, so that the dominant strategy in the one period game is for each
firm to produce in both markets. Thus, the unique equilibrium to this
subgame has the characteristic that both firms can be made worse off by
the existence of the flexible technology.
FIRM 2
B A&B
FIRM 1 A MB DA MB DA
FIRM A & B ( 1 , 2 ) (1+ , 2 + 2 )
DM DB DA DB DA DB
Figure 1: Production subgame for the two firms when (K A B , KAB) is the period 0 technology
choice and the length of the game is T=1. Both firms producing for both markets, i.e., (A&B, A&B)
is the dominant strategy (Prisoners' Dilemma) solution.
Suppose now, in the (KAB,KAB) case, that the production game is
played for some finite number (T>I) of periods. We refer to this case as
Scenario I. The argument here will follow the traditional analysis of a
repeated prisoner's dilemma. In particular, we use backwards induction by
examining the game in period T, and then inductively examining the game
in each preceding period, conditioned upon the outcomes of the successive
periods. Thus, in our game in period T, we have a one-period production
game remaining, with the associated prisoners' dilemma situation. The
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9dominant strategy in this case is for both players to produce for both
markets. In period T-l, each firm knows that its rival will produce for both
markets in the following period. Thus, in this period, both will again
produce for both markets. Using backwards induction, we find that in a
game played a finite number of times (with the length of this horizon
known to both players), the equilibrium is that both firms will produce for
both markets in each period. Each firm would prefer the cooperative
outcome, but there is no equilibrium that achieves it.
The prisoners' dilemma outcome in the (KAB, KAB) case is driven
primarily by the assumption that T is finite and deterministic. However,
for alternate model formulation assumptions, this outcome can be
reversed: In equilibrium, each firm may choose to produce only for the
market specified in the initial collusive agreement even though both have
acquired the flexible technology. We describe such settings below, and
refer to them, collectively, as Scenario II.
Scenario II can be obtained in any of three ways: (1) if the game is
played for an infinite number of periods, (2) if there is uncertainty about
the length of the game, or (3) if the game is played for a finite number of
periods with incomplete information about rivals' payoffs. For case (1),
this result obtains via the Folk Theorem (Friedman (1977) or Tirole
(1988)). This theorem illustrates how the mutual threat of infinite horizon
retaliation for violating a collusive agreement can be used to enforce that
agreement.
In each period that both firms honor the agreement, the profits
MA M D B DA DB
earned will be ( 7c2 B), which dominates the ( + T 1, 2 +7t 2 )
payoffs that prevail without the agreement. Deviation from the
agreement, by firm 2, for example, could yield one period of additional
profits corresponding to the added duopoly profits from invading firm l's
market, but, in subsequent periods, each firm will earn only the
"punishment" profits of (Al + 2 + 2 ) because firm 1 will revert to
the prisoners' dilemma equilibrium (grim strategies) and begin producing
output for both markets for the remainder of the infinite production
horizon. This reaction by firm 1 constitutes a credible threat since firm 1
prefers the profits earned as a duopolist in two markets to the profits of a
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duopolist in a single market. Likewise, firm 2 can also maintain this sort of
threat to keep firm 1 from entering market B. In the formal result
(Freedman 1977; Tirole 1988), if the discount factor 8 is not too small, such
credible threats of infinite retaliation can sustain (r 1M A 2 B) profits in the
game of infinite length.
For case (2), when the length of time that the markets will be
profitable is stochastic, the form of the analysis is similar. Suppose there is
a time-independent positive probability that the game could end after
each period. A firm that considers violating the agreement must once again
consider the losses it must suffer for the duration of the game after the
period of deviation with the one period gain. However, because there is
some probability each period that the game will end, the significance of the
future losses is diminished. In effect, the firms discount the future more
heavily than in the deterministic, infinite horizon case; the effective
discount factor is the product of the original discount factor and the
probability that the game continues for another period. The one-period
gain sufficient for deviation is therefore smaller than in the deterministic,
infinitely repeated game, i.e. where the probability that the game
continues and is equal to one. However, the net effect of this assumption is
to make the model more realistic (by acknowledging that an infinite
horizon of production may not be realistic) while achieving the possibility
that equilibrium behavior can still yield a result where firms who have
both purchased flexible capacity do not invade each other's market.
For case (3), the Pareto-optimal stage outcome can be achieved in
equilibrium (for a vast majority of the periods) when the industry horizon
has a finite, fixed length, but each firm does not know with certainty the
payoffs earned by its rival. The generalized model of this situation is
formalized as a finitely repeated game with incomplete information by
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1984). We refer the reader to their
results and only mention it to include it as a case within the set of games
that have a solution that Pareto-dominates the Scenario I outcome.
Thus, in addition to the Scenario I situation where the industry
horizon is finite and deterministic so that the prisoners' dilemma outcome
obtains, there are also reasonable formulations such that each firm will
choose to produce, in equilibrium, only in its own market even though both
III
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firms have purchased the flexible capacity. We group these three cases
together and refer to them collectively as Scenario II. For the remainder
of the paper, for ease of notation and calculation, we will focus our
Scenario II analysis on case (1) above, when T is infinite.
Analysis of First-Stage Outcomes
Having discussed, for Scenarios I and II, the second-stage outcomes
for each of the four possible investment pairs, we now consider the Period
O investment decisions by comparing for each firm, the investment
opportunity of acquiring the flexible technology versus acquiring only
dedicated capacity. For Scenario I, the marginal profit available to each
firm from buying the flexible technology is the additional duopoly profit
stream from invading its rival's market, independent of which technology
the rival has purchased. Consider the firm profits in Figure 2. First,
suppose that firm 2 buys the dedicated technology. If firm 1 also buys
dedicated technology, then it will earn monopoly profits from market A.
However, if firm 1 buys the flexible technology then it will earn duopoly
profits from market B in addition to the monopoly profits from market A.
FIRM 2
FIRM 1 KB KAB
T T
T T
KAB -CAB+ tXMA+ .D -CA + 1 (XDA M(CB l)-C CG) CAB + X(A 2 )
T T T
-C_ B + Xa DB _CAB+ yj ( D DB)
-C + Y18 2 - 2 2+ t)
Figure 2: Scenario I profit streams (In each of the four cells,
Firm l's payoffs appear above Firm 2's.)
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Now suppose that firm 2 buys the flexible technology. If firm 1 buys only
dedicated capacity then, because firm 2 will invade market A, firm 1 will
only earn duopoly profits from market A. If firm 1 also purchases flexible
technology then it will be able to retaliate and earn additional duopoly
profits in market B. These observations yield the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: Under Scenario I (i.e., T is finite and deterministic) the
following two conditions are sufficient for both firms to purchase the
flexible technology:
CAB C A DB
C C<871 (3.1)
.1
and
AB B T t DA
CAB-CB t D2 (3.2)
PROOF: As can be seen from Figure 2, the marginal benefit to firm 1 of
T
purchasing the flexible technology is :1 , regardless of firm 2's decision.
The marginal cost of purchasing KAB, over purchasing KA is (CAB-CA).
Therefore firm 1 will purchase KAB if condition (i) holds. The analysis for
firm 2 is similar. ·
Now consider Scenario II, the case where threats of infinite horizon
retaliation, made credible by holding the capability to produce for both
markets, can deter each firm from invading its rival's market. Figure 3
illustrates the payoff matrix for Scenario II (for the case where T=oo).
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FIRM 2
FIRM 1 KB K AB
KA CA+ CtMA _CA+ tIDA
4 t
.cB+XBlnB DA MB
KA -CA + C;g (XMf~+cDB" -C + St MIA
CB + Ft DB M + tX2s
-C 7C 2 -C ±8n27r
t=1
Figure 3: Scenario II profit streams
Consider the decision facing firm 1. (The analysis for firm 2 is
analogous.) Purchase of the flexible system by firm 1 could be interpreted
both as an "offensive" and a "defensive" trategic move. Firm 1 could use
the flexible technology as an offensive tool to invade its competitor's
market; this will happen if firm 2 cannot retaliate because it did not
purchase the flexible technology. In particular, if firm 2 chose KB, firm 1
Tt DB
would purchase KAB if CAB cA< X61t (The analogous condition holds
when the roles of the two firms are reversed.)
Firm l's purchase of a flexible system may also be seen as a
defensive or protective measure against the possibility that firm 2 might
invade firm l's market. If firm 2 purchased KAB, then firm 1 can defend
its monopoly in market A only by purchasing KAB so that it has a credible
retaliatory threat with which to deter firm 1 from entering. Otherwise,
firm 2 will invade market A without fear of retaliation. Therefore, if firm
2 owned the flexible technology, then firm 1 would purchase KAB if
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CAB CA < O 1 -I )
These arguments demonstrate that under Scenario II (for T=o), that
firm 1 will acquire flexible capacity if and only if
CA<mI t MA DA) t D
"1 '-Q / (3.3)
and firm 2 will acquire flexible capacity if and only if
CAB CB (IMB EDB) 1tD
':* = . (3.4)
However, by Assumption 2.5, for both (3.3) and (3.4), the left hand
term in the brackets is always the larger of the two, so this result can be
expressed as:
PROPOSITION 2: Under Scenario II (T=oo), firm 1 will acquire the flexible
technology if and only if
CABCA< 7r1 /(1-8),
and firm 2 will acquire the flexible technology if and only if
CAB CB< n2 /(1-8)
Therefore, if flexible capacity is not too costly, then each firm will
buy flexible capacity but produce only for its home market.
Three features of this result stand out. First, as expected in games
of this type, the ability to credibly threaten retaliation by maintaining the
15
capability to enter a rival's market, allows firms to achieve higher profits
due to successful enforcement of collusive agreements.
Second, firms acquire flexible capacity for strategic considerations,
and then use this flexible technology inflexibly, that is, to produce only one
product. Flexible technology serves only as a deterrent which the owner
hopes never to have to use. (Note the similarity with the nuclear arsenals
held by the United States and the Soviet Union. Rotemberg and Saloner
(1989) make the same point with respect to the use of strategic
inventories to deter entry.) (In a somewhat different setting, Fine and Li
(1988) provide an alternate reason why firms may sometimes use flexible
technology inflexibly: Such an outcome may arise because, as products
move through their respective life cycles, one product has sufficiently
large volume to require the entire stock of flexible capacity, and the life
cycles of all other products have either ended or have not yet begun.)
Third, in all of the cases examined, the existence of flexible capacity
at a low cost makes both firms worse off because of the competitive
market in which they must operate. This result contrasts sharply with the
results of Fine and Freund (1990) and others, where a monopolist's profits
increase as the cost of the flexible technology declines.
4. Model II: Dynamic Technology Acquisition Opportunities
In this section we modify the assumption that technology acquisition
can occur only once. We assume that in each period (t=1,2,...,T) both firms
simultaneously make technology decisions, then jointly observe the
technologies chosen, and finally make production decisions. The
assumptions about the relative costs of the different types of technology
and the profits for each firm from each market are the same as given
earlier. In addition, the focal point assumptions of the pregame agreement
are the same: firm 1 gets market A as its home or base market, and firm
2 gets market B. Since the markets are assigned in this fashion, both firms
prefer that each firm buys only the dedicated technology needed for its
own market. Our intent is to analyze whether the ability to purchase, on
short notice, the technology to invade one's rival's market, provides a
sufficient threat to prevent competitive entry, while allowing each firm to
avoid having to invest in capabilities for both markets. We find that this
III
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outcome obtains for some values of the model's parameters, but several
other outcomes can also occur.
In period 0, each firm chooses between buying the dedicated
technology for its own market or buying the flexible technology.
Subsequent to period 0, if a firm initially purchased only the dedicated
technology for its own market and wants to enter its rival's market (or
wants a more immediate threat to enter), it will purchase the other
dedicated technology. (Since the flexible technology costs more to acquire
than either dedicated technology, this is the least costly way to acquire,
subsequent to period 0, the technology for one's rival's market (assuming,
as we do, negligible salvage value of used equipment).) Once a firm owns
the capability to produce for both markets, it no longer has any further
technology acquisition decisions to make. We assume that technology
investments are irreversible acquisitions of production capabilities.
As in the previous section, we first analyze Scenario I: the case
where the time horizon T is finite and deterministic. Consider the start of
period T. Four possible combinations of the two firms' technological
capabilities are possible. These are: (1) each can only produce for its home
market, (2) firm 1 has only A capacity and firm 2 has A and B capacity, (3)
firm 1 has A and B capacity and firm 2 has only B capacity, and (4) both
firms have A and B capacity. We denote these four states, respectively, as
(A,B), (A,AB), (AB,A), and (AB,AB). Note that a firm can have capability to
produce both products either from having acquired KAB in period 0 or
from having acquired KA and KB in different periods.
Consider first the (AB,AB) state. No further technology will be
acquired in period T, and since this is the final period, the firms face a one-
shot prisoners' dilemma-type game as discussed in the previous section.
Therefore, each will produce for both markets and earn duopoly profits in
both markets.
Consider next the (AB,B) state. If firm 2 purchases KA at cost CA,
then each firm will earn duopoly profits in both markets in period T. If
DBfirm 2 does not purchase KA, then it will earn 2 ,whereas firm 1 will earn
MA DEB.Fr A DA A
+ 7tl . Firm 2 will therefore purchase K if and only if U2 > C
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Similarly, in the (A,AB) state, firm 1 will purchase KB if and only if
DB> C B
In the (A,B) state the firms face the following game in period T:
FIRM 2
FIRM 1 No Purchase Purchase KA
No Purchase x 2MA M DA MB DA C ANo Purchase (7e1 +X12 C.X2) ( 1 - 2 2 2 -
Purchase KB MA DBCB DB 
Figure 4: Technology acquisition subgame at the start of period T.
Independent of firm 2's action, firm l's dominant choice is to purchase KB
if and only if I 1 B> CB . Similarly, firm 2 will purchase KA if and only if
7> A C . For each firm, regardless of its rival's choice, it only pays to
purchase capacity to invade the rival's market if the duopoly profits from
that market exceed the acquisition cost.
Now consider the subgame beginning at some time t {1, 2, ... , T-1}.
Again, the four possible states are (A,B), (A,AB), (AB,B), (AB,AB). By our
previous arguments, the last pair yields the outcome that each firm earns
duopoly profits in both markets for the remainder of the finite time
horizon. For the (AB, B) state, we first observe that if firm 2 finds it
profitable to acquire K A in period t2, then firm 2 will also find it
profitable to acquire KA in t-l, the previous period. That is, if a firm is
ever going to acquire a retaliatory capability, it will do so sooner rather
than later. Firm 2 will acquire KA in period t1 if the state is (AB, B) and
S( DA ) > C (4.1)
it
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That is, if firm 1 has acquired the capability to produce for both markets,
whereas firm 2 can only produce for market B, then if (4.1) holds firm 2
will acquire KA to achieve duopoly profits in market A since it cannot keep
firm 1 out of market B. The (A, AB) state is completely symmetric: firm 1
will purchase KB in period t if the state is (A, AB) and
T
> C B
~(ff1r ) > C (4.2)
The conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are more easily satisfied for smaller values
of t. Therefore, if for some t>l, one or both of these conditions hold, then,
because the payoff data is stationary and deterministic, the condition(s)
would have held at t-l and, inductively, at t=l. Therefore, in the (AB, B)
and (A, AB) states, a firm will retaliate as soon as possible or not at all,
depending, respectively, on whether (4.1) or (4.2) holds for t=1.
Finally, consider the (A, B) case. This situation will arise if each firm
purchased only the dedicated technology for its home market in period 0
and neither firm has added any technology up until time t. At time t=T, as
discussed earlier, each firm will follow its dominant strategy, independent
of its rivals action. Therefore, any actions taken by firm i at t=T-1 will not
affect the period T actions of firm j (j i). Therefore, by backward
induction, for general t<T in the (A, B) state, firm 1 will acquire KB if and
only if (4.2) holds, and firm 2 will acquire KA if and only if (4.1) holds.
Again, (4.1) and (4.2) are more easily satisfied for smaller t's, so that if a
firm is ever going to acquire the technology to invade its rival's market, it
will do so at time 0. Furthermore, since at time 0 a firm may purchase
KAB, which is cheaper than acquiring KA and KB separately, the relevant
conditions are weaker than (4.1) and (4.2) at t=O. For each firm, the
discounted duopoly profit stream need only exceed the marginal cost of
acquiring the dedicated technology for its own market. That is, firm 1 will
purchase KAB at time 0 if
DB>CAB CA , (4.3)
and firm 2 will buy KAB at time 0 if
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Again, we observe that the existence of flexible capacity can make
the firms worse off: If
T
C > 1 DB > C - C (4.5)
and
CB>C (4.6)DA BC >c -CB, (4.6)
then the availability of the flexible technology at cost CAB leads both firms
to purchase it and earn duopoly profits over the T-period horizon. If KA B
did not exist, or if its cost, CAB were high enough to reverse the direction
of the second inequality in each of (4.5) and (4.6), then, provided that the
discounted monopoly profits in each market exceeded the acquisition cost
of the respective dedicated technology, each firm's dominant strategy
would be to remain a dedicated monopolist in its own market.
We turn now to Scenario II, in which credible threats of retaliation
can effectively deter each firm from invading its rival's market, allowing
each firm to earn larger equilibrium profit rates than those achieved in the
deterministic, finite horizon game. Again we focus our analysis on the
deterministic case with T=oo. In Section 3, where the one-time technology
purchases occurred simultaneously, no retaliation was possible by a firm
that chose to buy only dedicated capacity in period 0. Therefore, the need
for retaliatory capability forced each firm to acquire flexible technology
from the start. In the analysis that follows, a firm can adopt a "wait and
see" technology adoption strategy: Begin by adopting the technology only
for one's own market and then acquire technology for one's rival's market
only if retaliatory capability becomes necessary.
__11--_11___._ .
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In the analysis that follows, we assume that neither firm will ever
find it profitable to invade its rival to earn only one period of duopoly
profits if doing so triggers the infinite retaliation response. Let VD and VD
represent, respectively, for firms 1 and 2, the value to that firm of
defending its market from permanent incursion by its rival. That is, we let
t MA DA MA DA
VD F (X - 1 )= (X1 -1
and
2 t MB DB MB DB
VI= L (C -, 2 )= (t 2 - 2 )(
Also, let V and V2o represent, respectively, for firms 1 and 2, the value
to that firm of an offensive strategy, i.e., invading its rival's market and
earning duopoly profits there. That is, we let
V1 t DB DB/0 )
"t and
DA 7DA
VoF s( 72 )= t2 Y(1-)
Recall from Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5 that the valuing of defending either
i j
market exceeds the value of invading either market. That is, VD > VO, for
i, j=l, 2.
The equilibrium outcome(s) for this game depend(s) on the relative
magnitudes of VD and Vb, for i, j=l, 2, as well as the values of CA, CB, and
CAB. If VD>C , then firm 1 has a credible threat to acquire dedicated B
technology to retaliate if firm 2 invaded its market. Therefore, if this
condition holds, firm 2 would never acquire A capacity, either with flexible
or dedicated technology, solely to invade its rival's market because the
invasion would violate the collusive agreement and trigger retaliation,
II
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making firm 2 worse off. The symmetric statement (with the firm and
market labels reversed) holds if 4D> C. Therefore, if both of these
conditions (VD>C and VD>CA) hold, then each firm will acquire
dedicated capacity and stick to its own market.
1 AB A
If V< C - C , then the value of successfully invading market B is
so small for firm 1 that it would never acquire the capability to do so even
if it were certain that firm 2 would not retaliate. The symmetric statement
holds for firm 2 if V2<CAB - C. Therefore, if both of these conditions
1 CAB C A V2AB GB(V 0 <C - C and V2<C - CB) hold, then each firm will acquire
dedicated capacity and stick to its own market. Clearly the most
interesting cases lie between the extremes of this and the previous
paragraphs.
In fact, there are 18 distinct cases that arise for this model. We
describe these in the Appendix. The results described there show that a
variety of equilibria are possible: Both firms may acquire dedicated
capacity and stick to their own respective markets, both firms may buy
KAB but produce only for their own markets, or one firm may buy KAB and
invade its rival while the other resigns itself to such entry. The common
thread here, however, as above, is that the existence of flexible capacity
(especially at a low price) can make firms worse off: Flexible capacity may
be purchased but used to produce only one product or its existence could
cause mutual market invasions, lowering profitability for both firms.
5. Concluding Discussion
Our paper examines the strategic effects of flexible manufacturing
systems on the technology investments of competing firms in an industry.
We have developed a two-firm, two-market model in which each each firm
has one of the markets as its base or home market. Our profit structure
assumptions dictate (1) that the two markets are of comparable size, and
(2) that each firm would prefer to function as a monopolist in only one
market than to operate as a duopolist in both markets. We then use a
_I___ _____lq__L·_n__j 
_I_____
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game-theoretic analysis to derive equilibrium technology investments for
this setting. We first allow a one-time technology acquisition opportunity
before production is permitted (Section 3), and then relax this assumption
to allow technology purchase before each production period (Section 4).
Obviously, our model is very stylized and many of our assumptions
may not hold in a particular industry. However, we believe that the model
does capture some of the basic characteristics of product-flexible
manufacturing systems and competitive interaction, so that the insights
from the model can be useful for practitioners who must consider the
strategic implications of their technology investment opportunities.
Our results suggest that unless (1) industry conditions allow
collusive agreements that can be enforced by credible commitments to
retaliate against entry and (2) firms can develop capabilities to produce for
a rival's market on relatively short notice, then the existence of flexible
technology will make firms worse off, providing the flexible technology is
not too expensive. Condition (1) can be achieved in a repeated-game
model if (i) the horizon is infinite, (ii) the horizon length is stochastic, or
(iii) each firm has incomplete information about its rival's payoffs.
We note that in this analysis all of the outcomes are cast in terms of
their impact on producers without considering consumer welfare. Clearly,
there are some instances in which consumers benefit from the existence of
a flexible technology. Specifically, these are the cases in which firms are
unable to credibly threaten a retaliation to invasion and thus unable to
sustain monopoly production in their assigned markets. However, in
games whose outcome has both firms using flexible capacity inflexibly,
consumers do not benefit from the existence of flexible technology and
producers spend more on technology (for the same net revenues) than
they would if the flexible technolgy did not exist. The winners in this case
are the capital goods producers who supply the flexible technologies.
The results from explicit consideration of competition with flexible
technology contrast sharply with the single-firm analysis of Fine and
Freund (1990), in which a firm operating as a monopolist is unequivocally
better off with a low-cost flexible manufacturing system investment
option. This contrast suggests that the evaluation of flexible
manufacturing system investment opportunities should take into account
competitive interaction effects.
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Appendix: Description of the 18 cases from Section 4, Scenario II
As discussed near the end of Section 4, the equilibrium outcome for
Scenario II when investments may be made in any period depends on the
relative magnitudes of VD and V 0 , for i, j=l, 2, and CA, CB, and CAB. We
list and discuss below ten mutually exclusive combinations of these
parameters. Each of the other eight cases is symmetric to one of the cases
numbered 2-9, with the roles of firms 1 and 2 reversed, and the market
labels, A and B, reversed.
Note that in Section 3, to have a credible retaliation threat in the face
of an invasion by its rival, a firm had to acquire KAB in period 0 since no
later purchase of capacity was possible. In this scenario, a firm has an
additional means to credibly threaten its rival since it may purchase
additional dedicated capacity at a later time if threatened by a market
invasion. The conditions for this to occur require that VD> Cm, i=1,2 and m
corresponding to the dedicated technology used for production in the
rival's market.
The equilibria for a given parameter relationship are given in terms
of (i) the capacity acquisition outcome (ii) the existence of a credible threat
to enter later if invaded if only dedicated capacity is purchased in period 0
(since purcahse of flexible capacity always constitutes a credible threat)
and '(iii) the resulting market production scheme.
Parameter Relationships Equilibrium Outcome
1. V>C (KA,KB)
V2D>CA Each firm has a credible threat
in later periods
Each produces only for own market
Parameter Relationships Equilibrium Outcome
(KAKAB)2. VD>C VO>CB
Firm 1 has a credible threat for later
CAB CB<V2 <CA
1 CB CAB CA<V <cB
3. VD> 0
CAB. CB<V2 <CA
1 C l Hi< cA 
4. VD>C V < AB CA
CAB- CB<v2 <CA
Firm 2 buys KAB, because of the
value of V 0
No market invasion
Two pure strategy equilibria arise:
1. (K,K B)
Firm 1 has credible threat, no
value to immediate offensive
Firm 2 has no credible threat later
No market invasion
2. (KABKAB)
Both immediately establish
credible threats
No market invasion
(KA, KB)
Firm 1 has credible threat,
but will not invade
Firm 2 has no credible threat for
later invasions
No market invasion
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Parameter Relationships Equilibrium Outcome
1 B
5. VD>C V>CABCB
VD<CAB_ C B
1 E I cAB_ cB6. VD> C VCABCB
V < CAB_ C B
7. CABCA<V1 < CB, V as in (2)-(4)
CAB CB<V2 <CAD
8. CAB CA<V < CB, VO< CAB- CA
a<CA- CAB
(K AB, KB)
Firm 1 has offensive value
No credible threat for firm 2
Firm 1 invades market B
(KA, KB)
Firm 1 has credible threat
no value to offense
Firm 2 has no credible threat
No market invasion
Two pure strategy equilibria arise:
1.(KAKB )
Neither has credible threat for later
No market invasion
2. (KAB,KAB)
Both immediately establish credible
threat
No market invasion
(KA, KB)
Firm 1 has credible threat
no value to offense
Firm 2 has no credible threat later
No market invasion
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Parameter Relationships Equilibrium Outcome
9. CAB- CA<VI < CB V> CAB- CA
V < CA- CAB
10. V<CABCA
V2 < CAB - C BV2cDC
(K A B, KB)
Firm 1 values offense
Firm 2 never has credible threat
Firm 1 invades market B
(KA, KB)
Neither offense nor defense pays
No market invasion
26
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